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Article
Religious Accommodation at Work: Lessons from 
Labor Law
CHARLOTTE GARDEN
When should employers be exempted from generally applicable law 
because of their religious beliefs? Variations on this question have reached 
the Supreme Court in a series of recent cases. But these high profile, 
politically charged disputes represent only a subset of the religious 
accommodation claims with which agencies and courts are grappling. 
Other contexts yield useful insights about how we might strike a balance 
between employer religious liberty and legal protections for third parties, 
including employees. 
This Article focuses on arguments by religiously affiliated colleges and 
universities that they should be exempt from the National Labor Relations 
Act. It begins by tracing the recent history of those arguments, and predicts 
that they will enjoy a warmer reception from the Trump NLRB than they 
did from the Obama Board. It then discusses how the legal dispute over 
union organizing at religious institutions of higher education helps 
illuminate aspects of the larger debate over religious liberty for 
enterprises. First, this dispute illustrates courts’ difficulties in separating 
questions about employer religious liberty from courts’ conceptions of 
appropriate managerial prerogative. Second, it shows both that some 
religious exemptions have significant value in secular markets, and when
that is true, employers may be able to negotiate accommodations that 
partially compensate employees for the costs they incur as a result of 
employer accommodations.
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CHARLOTTE GARDEN *
INTRODUCTION
Three times in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has grappled with 
clashes between generally applicable law and an enterprise’s religious 
exercise—yet many thorny questions surrounding religious 
accommodations for enterprises remain. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Court held that the Commission 
violated a baker’s First Amendment rights by conveying disrespect to his 
religious beliefs, but did not resolve whether public accommodations laws 
must ever yield to accommodate market participants’ religious beliefs.1
The other two cases falling into this category involved employers seeking 
exemptions from their obligations under the Affordable Care Act. In 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Court held that under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, certain companies were entitled to an exemption 
from the “contraceptive mandate” based on the religious objections of their 
owners, at least where the federal government had already devised an 
accommodation available to some employers.2 And in Zubik v. Burwell, the 
Court did not reach a decision; instead, it remanded the case so that the 
parties could attempt to reach a satisfactory arrangement on their own.3
Although these cases illustrate only a narrow swath of the types of 
cases related to religious exercise that reach the courts,4 they have captured 
the majority of the public attention.5 This is at least in part because these 
                                                                                                                         
* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I am grateful to participants in the 
Religious Freedom: Liberty, Legislation, and Litigation symposium for their helpful feedback and 
suggestions, to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review for their careful work on this essay, and to 
Joseph Wright for his invaluable research assistance.
1 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014). 
3 Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (“[T]he Court vacates the judgments below and 
remands to the respective United States Courts of Appeals . . . . [T]he parties on remand should be 
afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ 
religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 
‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’” (quoting Supplemental 
Brief for Respondent at 1, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-1418))).
4 See, e.g., Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
1(a) (allowing prisoners to assert religious exercise claims).
5 See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, The Disappearance of Religion from Debates about Religious 
Accommodation, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 (2017) (discussing the various types of 
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cases also implicate sexual orientation, sexual autonomy, and women’s full 
participation in the workforce. Still, as courts, legislatures, and the public 
grapple with whether and when it is appropriate to accommodate corporate
religious exercise, it can be useful to consider a wider range of contexts in 
which those questions arise. This Article attempts to do that by focusing on 
arguments by religiously affiliated colleges and universities (RACUs) that 
they should be exempt from the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may take 
jurisdiction over bargaining units of educators working at RACUs has 
become a contentious issue over the last several years, as unions like the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) have sought to organize 
adjunct professors, graduate students, and others at both secular and 
religious schools.6 In 2014, the NLRB announced a new test for deciding 
these questions, which no circuit court has yet reviewed.7 However, that 
will soon change, and in any event, the NLRB under President Trump is 
likely to revisit this test, should the opportunity arise.
This Article begins by tracing the recent history of the law governing 
NLRB jurisdiction over educators working at RACUs and explains that 
even though the Board’s new standard is relatively favorable to unions, it 
is unlikely to be useful under the Trump NLRB. It then discusses three 
ways that the legal dispute over union organizing at RACUs helps 
illuminate aspects of the larger debate over religious liberty for enterprises. 
First, it illustrates how difficult it is for the Court to separate employer and 
employee religious liberty from ideas about the scope of employers’ 
authority. Second, it shows that some religious exemptions have significant 
market value to the employers that seek them—a complicating factor that 
is not necessarily present in every context in which corporations seek 
religious accommodations. Third, it argues that while the Court’s approach 
to religious exemptions to labor law does not now require exempt 
employers to attempt to negotiate an accommodation that compensates
employees for their loss of statutory rights, there is reason to believe 
employers and unions could succeed in in doing just that. Further, labor 
law may be a context in which interested parties are relatively likely to be 
                                                                                                                         
challenges to accommodation laws, including contraception and same-sex marriage); Andrew 
Koppleman, Kent Greenawalt, Defender of the Faith, 95 TEX. L. REV. 821, 821 (2017) (reviewing 
KENT GREENAWALT, EXEMPTIONS: NECESSARY, JUSTIFIED, OR MISGUIDED? (2016)) (arguing that the 
“coalition” in which “almost everybody loved the idea of exempting religious objectors from generally 
applicable laws” was “splintered” by religious-based challenges to the contraceptive mandate and 
public-accommodations laws).
6 Standing Up for Higher Education, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION,
http://seiufacultyforward.org/ [https://perma.cc/P7SB-B9WZ] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
7 See infra notes 27–35 and accompanying text (describing the test adopted in Pacific Lutheran).
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able to negotiate a religious accommodation—though it is not a context in 
which the Court has encouraged that outcome.
I. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS:
AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
This Part begins with an overview of recent legal developments 
regarding NLRB jurisdiction over religious colleges and universities, 
focusing in particular on the Board’s recent decision in Pacific Lutheran 
University. It then provides an overview of labor organizing at religious 
colleges and universities, including related litigation following Pacific 
Lutheran. Finally, it situates Pacific Lutheran against the Board’s history 
of policy oscillation, observing that the newly configured Trump Board is 
likely to revisit that case if given the opportunity. 
A. The Genesis of the Pacific Lutheran University Standard
In recent years, the question of whether adjunct professors and others 
who teach at RACUs may unionize has become important. This is in large 
part because of the SEIU’s wide-ranging and often successful “Faculty 
Forward” campaign to organize adjuncts, graduate students, and other 
academic workers in higher education.8 This campaign responds to higher 
education’s increasing reliance on adjunct and contingent faculty to deliver 
core education to students at a cheaper price.9 The SEIU’s organizing 
campaigns have tended to focus on two main components: first, pay and 
benefits; and second, job predictability and stability.10
Colleges and universities have responded in a range of ways to 
on-campus organizing drives. Some have waged public relations 
campaigns aimed at encouraging their employees to vote against union 
representation,11 and have also argued before the NLRB that their 
                                                                                                                         
8 See SERVICE EMPLOYEES, supra note 6 (noting that the group is advocating for change in the 
education system); Justin Miller, When Adjuncts Go Union, AM. PROSPECT (June 30, 2015), 
http://prospect.org/article/when-adjuncts-go-union [https://perma.cc/8MU6-WTY2] (describing SEIU’s 
announcement of “a highly ambitious long-term plan to organize one million adjunct faculty members 
nationwide”). 
9 See Larry Gordon, California Colleges See Surge in Efforts to Unionize Adjunct Faculty, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015, 6:00PM) http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-me-unions-colleges-20150104-
story.html [https://perma.cc/G7MS-48VS] (stating that, according to William Herbert of the National 
Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, at Hunter 
College in New York, “[t]he unusual number of union campaigns springs from the use of more part-
time instructors as a way to reduce the hiring of tenure-track faculty”).
10 See Colleen Flaherty, $15,000 Per Course?, SLATE (Feb. 12, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/inside_higher_ed/2015/02/_15_000_per_course_the_seiu_s_faculty_
forward_sets_a_goal_for_adjunct_professor.html [https://perma.cc/9HNM-WV7T] (discussing the pay 
per course that some instructors and professors are pushing for at some universities). 
11 See Colleen Flaherty, For Your Anti-Union Information, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 30, 2016) 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/08/30/crop-anti-union-university-websites-sparks-
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employees are ineligible to unionize for a range of reasons.12 On the other 
hand, some schools have maintained a neutral stance regarding the 
possibility of their academic workers unionizing, and have successfully 
negotiated collective bargaining agreements with elected unions.13
That same range of responses exists with respect to RACUs. For 
example, Georgetown University did not oppose a union drive by its 
adjunct professors, who then voted to be represented by an SEIU local 
union and later successfully bargained their first contract with the 
university;14 on the other hand, Georgetown is opposing a union drive by 
its graduate students.15 In contrast, other RACUs have fought adjunct 
union drives inside and outside the NLRB’s adjudicative process.16
However, a key difference between RACUs and secular private colleges 
and universities is that only the former can argue that their religious 
character should preclude the NLRB from taking jurisdiction over their 
instructor workforces.
The scope of the NLRA’s application at religious colleges and 
universities is governed at least in part by the Supreme Court decision 
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.17 In that case, the Court relied on the 
canon of constitutional avoidance to hold that the NLRB was not 
authorized to take jurisdiction over a bargaining unit of lay teachers at a 
                                                                                                                         
criticism-proponents-graduate-assistant [https://perma.cc/79CQ-7DG4] (describing anti-union websites 
hosted by universities facing union drives). 
12 For example, Columbia University fought a union drive launched by the United Auto Workers 
both by campaigning against the union over a prolonged period of time and arguing before the NLRB 
that graduate student workers did not qualify as “employees” who are eligible to unionize under the 
NLRA. The NLRB ruled against Columbia and the graduate students voted in favor of unionization; 
Columbia is now in the process of appealing that decision. See Tr. of Columbia Univ. N.Y., 364 
N.L.R.B. No. 90, 1–2 (Aug. 23, 2016) (holding that Columbia graduate assistants were employees 
under the NLRA); Elizabeth A. Harris, Student Unionizing to Go to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2018, 
at A21 (describing Columbia’s litigation stance regarding graduate assistant unionization). 
13 See Landmark Neutrality and Election Agreement for Barnard College Contingent Faculty,
UAW (July 20, 2015), http://uaw.org/landmark-neutrality-and-election-agreement-for-barnard-college-
contingent-faculty/ [https://perma.cc/W2X4-B4FE] (discussing that Barnard President Debora Spar 
“pledge[d] to remain neutral . . . and encourage[d] everyone in the Barnard community . . . to also 
remain neutral by refraining from campaigning for or against the Union”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
14 Peter Schmidt, Georgetown U. Adjuncts Vote to Unionize, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 3, 
2013), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Georgetown-U-Adjuncts-Vote-to/139069 [https://perma.cc/
3EEA-PCQA].
15 Colleen Flaherty, Graduate Students Protest Georgetown’s Position on Union, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED. (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/12/07/graduate-students-protest-
georgetowns-position-union [https://perma.cc/TP77-M2ZT].
16 One of these schools is Seattle University, which is also my employer. Seattle Univ., 364 
N.L.R.B. No. 84, 1–3 (Aug. 23, 2016).
17 440 U.S. 490 (1979). I have previously analyzed and critiqued Catholic Bishop, and I do not 
repeat that discussion here. See generally Charlotte Garden, Religious Employers and Labor Law: 
Bargaining in Good Faith?, 96 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2016).
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parochial high school.18 Thus, Catholic Bishop stands for the proposition 
that there are at least some groups of employees of religiously affiliated 
organizations as to whom the NLRB may not take jurisdiction, whether or 
not the employer’s union opposition is motivated by religious or secular 
considerations. Or, as the Catholic Bishop Court approvingly described the 
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning below, “interference with management 
prerogatives, found acceptable in an ordinary commercial setting, was not 
acceptable in an area protected by the First Amendment.”19 In other words: 
the First Amendment has a role in resolving the interplay between an 
institution’s religious liberty and its management rights. Moreover, the 
Seventh Circuit viewed the First Amendment as having a larger role in the 
context of exemptions from labor law than from laws that implicated the 
institution in other ways, such as in its role as owner and manager of a 
piece of property or even its role as educator.20
Affirming the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court identified (but did 
not resolve) constitutional questions about the application of the NLRA to 
the parochial teachers. They included the risk of “entanglement” if the 
NLRB ordered a parochial school to bargain collectively with its teachers 
or adjudicated an unfair labor practice charge.21 Here, the Court was 
focused not just on the outcome of those processes, but on “the very 
process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions.”22 Moreover, the 
Court worried that the “introduction of a concept of mandatory collective 
bargaining, regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiation is defined, 
necessarily represents an encroachment upon the former autonomous 
position of management,”23 or that “conflicts” between “clergy-
administrators” and “negotiators for unions” might arise.24
The Catholic Bishop Court did not provide clear guidance on whether 
the NLRB should apply the same approach to other religiously affiliated 
employers, such as hospitals or universities. As a result, the NLRB and the 
circuit courts have struggled to apply Catholic Bishop in these contexts. I 
have discussed the history of the Board’s application of Catholic Bishop to 
other types of religious employers elsewhere.25 Suffice it to say, the 
Board’s pre-2014 approach was imperfect and had been criticized by 
                                                                                                                         
18 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500–01, 506–07.
19 Id. at 496.
20 See id. (describing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in which the “court distinguished local 
regulations which required fire inspections or state laws mandating attendance, reasoning that they did 
not ‘have the clear inhibiting potential upon the relationship between teachers and employers with 
which the present Board order is directly concerned’”).
21 Id. at 502.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 503 (quoting Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 267
(Pa. 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24 Id.
25 Garden, supra note 17, at 120–24.
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circuit courts, which in turn had suggested other approaches with their own 
problems.26
In 2014, a divided NLRB adopted a new standard to determine 
whether to accept jurisdiction over faculty at religiously affiliated colleges 
and universities in a decision known as Pacific Lutheran University.27
Under the Pacific Lutheran standard, the Board will accept jurisdiction 
over faculty members who are otherwise eligible to unionize unless “the 
university or college demonstrates, as a threshold matter, that it holds itself 
out as providing a religious educational environment, and that it holds out 
the petitioned-for faculty member[s] as performing a specific role in 
creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.”28
Both prongs of the new test reflect the Board majority’s 
understanding—based on Catholic Bishop—that it would be 
“impermissible” for the Board to inquire “into the good faith of the 
university’s position [that it is a religious institution] or an examination of 
how the university implements its religious mission.”29 Beyond that, the 
first prong is aimed at helping the Board determine “whether First 
Amendment concerns are even potentially implicated” in the case, and 
demands only that the university make a “minimal showing” that it holds 
itself out as religious in forums other than the NLRB.30 The Board’s 
second prong focuses on whether the RACU holds out individual 
instructors as playing a “specific role” in the school’s religious mission and 
was derived from the Catholic Bishop Court’s focus on teachers’ “‘critical 
and unique role’ in creating and sustaining a religious environment.”31
Thus, the Board drew a negative inference based on Catholic Bishop’s 
reasoning, concluding that ordering bargaining or adjudicating unfair labor 
practices in cases involving instructors who did not have a role to play in a 
school’s religious mission could not raise entanglement concerns.32
                                                                                                                         
26 Id.
27 Pac. Lutheran Univ., 361 N.L.R.B. 1404 (Dec. 16, 2014). This Article discusses only the 
aspects of Pacific Lutheran that relate to NLRB jurisdiction over religiously affiliated colleges and 
universities. It does not address questions related to when faculty members should be categorized as 
“managerial” workers who are ineligible to unionize for that reason. 
28 Id. at 1408. 
29 Id. at 1409. The Board’s view on this point is consistent with Catholic Bishop, though courts in 
other contexts assess whether individuals claiming entitlement to religious exemptions or 
accommodations are sincere in their purported beliefs. See Garden, supra note 17, at 145–46 
(describing the “difficulty of assessing whether subjective religious beliefs are sincere” in litigation).
30 Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1409–10.
31 Id. at 1410–11 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979)). 
32 Id. at 1411 (“Faculty members who are not expected to perform a specific role in creating or 
maintaining the school’s religious educational environment are indistinguishable from faculty at 
colleges and universities which do not identify themselves as religious institutions and which are 
indisputably subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. Both faculty provide nonreligious instruction and are 
hired, fired, and assessed under criteria that do not implicate religious considerations.”).
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However, the Board also concluded that its inquiry was restricted to 
examining how the RACU described individual faculty members’ duties, 
explaining that “if the college or university holds itself out as requiring its 
faculty to conform to its religious doctrine or to particular religious tenets 
or beliefs in a manner that is specifically linked to their duties as a faculty 
member, we will decline jurisdiction.”33
In contrast, the two NLRB dissenters concluded that even the Board’s 
limited and deferential inquiry into whether a RACU held out its faculty 
members as playing a role in its religious mission was more than Catholic 
Bishop allowed.34 Instead, they urged the Board to adhere to a test 
previously announced by the D.C. Circuit, in which the Board would 
decline jurisdiction over any institution that:
(a) holds itself out to students, faculty and community as 
providing a religious educational environment; (b) is 
organized as a nonprofit; and (c) is affiliated with, or 
owned, operated, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a 
recognized religious organization, or with an entity, 
membership of which is determined, at least in part, with 
reference to religion.35
Shortly after it decided Pacific Lutheran, the Board applied the new 
test in the context of adjunct union elections at other RACUs.36 Parsing 
how schools described individual instructors’ jobs, the Board in multiple 
cases ultimately excluded instructors charged with teaching religious 
doctrine from potential bargaining units, but accepted jurisdiction over 
bargaining units involving instructors of other subjects.37
However, as the next Section discusses, the Pacific Lutheran standard 
may be reversed by the Trump NLRB. Moreover, that danger is likely to 
prompt unions hoping to organize instructors at RACUs to eschew the 
NLRB election process for now, rendering the Pacific Lutheran standard 
mostly unusable as a practical matter.
                                                                                                                         
33 Id. at 1412.
34 Id. at 1430.
35 Id. at 1438 (citing Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
36 Seattle Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (Aug. 23, 2016).
37 See, e.g., id. (holding that some of the faculty, like calculus teachers, do not perform a specific 
religious function).
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B. What’s Next for Union Organizing at Religious Colleges and 
Universities?
The NLRB has been routinely criticized for policy oscillation,38 a fact 
of life that is probably inevitable given the role of partisan political 
affiliation in filling Board seats and the fact that the text of the NLRA itself 
leaves considerable room for interpretation.39 As NLRB seats come open, 
recent custom dictates that President Trump will appoint replacements so 
as to maintain three Republican and two Democratic members; as of the 
date this article was published, the Board was comprised of three 
Republican members and one Democratic member, with the remaining seat 
vacant.40
With its change in partisan valance, the Trump NLRB is likely to 
reverse Pacific Lutheran if given the chance. Already, the Board’s new 
general counsel has called for new Board complaints that implicate “cases 
[decided] over the last eight years that overruled precedent and involved 
one or more dissents”—a category that includes cases applying the Pacific 
Lutheran standard—to be “submitted to Advice.”41 Moreover, in the last
days of previous Board chairman Philip Miscimarra’s term, the Board 
issued a flurry of cases overturning decisions from the Obama Board era 
and even earlier.42
Given this political reality, unions are likely to conclude that 
attempting to proceed under the Pacific Lutheran standard will do nothing 
more than expend their own resources while giving the Trump Board an 
                                                                                                                         
38 See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: 
Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2015–16 
(2009) (discussing how NLRB policy oscillation undermines the NLRB’s legitimacy as expert policy 
maker).
39 Custom dictates that the president appoints three Board members from his own party and two 
from the other party. Board members serve staggered five-year terms. See Ronald Turner, Ideological 
Voting on the National Labor Relations Board Revisited (With Special Reference to 
Decision-Bargaining Over Employer Relocation Decisions), 14 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 24, 29–30
(2014) (discussing the inevitably political appointment process and its impact on Board members).
40 Steven M. Swirsky, What to Look Out for This Year at the NLRB, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 6, 
2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-to-look-out-year-nlrb [https://perma.cc/C3VT-
4ECR].
41 Memorandum from the Office of the General Counsel of the NLRB to All Regional Directors, 
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers at 1, 4–5 (Dec. 1, 2017), 
http://hr.cch.com/ELD/GC18_02MandatorySubmissionstoAdvice.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A8W-V3XA].
“Submitting a case to Advice” means that the Office of the General Counsel has an opportunity to 
direct that the Board’s prosecutorial arm take a particular position or argue the case in a particular way,
and it is often a first step in changing Board law.
42 See Andrew Strom, At the NLRB, GOP Board Members Show How to Play Hard Ball,
ONLABOR (Dec. 21, 2017), https://onlabor.org/at-the-nlrb-gop-board-members-show-how-to-play-
hard-ball/ [https://perma.cc/KYB4-75MM] (explaining that the new Republican majority on the NLRB 
issued five decisions that overturned precedent). 
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opportunity to overturn Pacific Lutheran. With little upside in sight, unions 
are unlikely to file new petitions seeking to represent instructors at RACUs 
and may withdraw existing petitions.43 Thus, even while Pacific Lutheran 
remains on the books, it is likely to be close to a dead letter for as long as 
the NLRB is controlled by Republicans. 
This is not to say, however, that no organizing will occur at RACUs. 
As noted above, some universities willingly agree to bargain collectively 
with a union once a majority of their employees indicate their support for 
that union without forcing an NLRB election.44 Thus, the Trump Board’s 
near-certain hostility to Pacific Lutheran is likely to place a premium on 
unions’ ability to convince employers to agree to remain neutral about the 
prospect of union organizing and to agree to alternative election 
procedures.45 Perhaps paradoxically, this means that the visibility of 
unions’ work organizing instructors at RACUs could increase rather than 
decrease, particularly on campuses where instructors and unions perceive 
that a robust publicity campaign might prompt an employer to agree to 
neutrality and an alternative election process.46
This Part has detailed the recent history of RACUs’ religious liberty 
claims involving the NLRA. The next Part contains a brief discussion of 
some ways that the fight over the application of the NLRA to religious 
employers might help inform the ongoing debate about other forms of 
religious accommodations for employers.
II. WHAT THE NLRA CONTEXT REVEALS ABOUT RELIGIOUS 
ACCOMMODATIONS AT WORK
A. Religious Accommodations and Employer Control
Cases about religious accommodations for employers could be 
recharacterized as cases about the scope of employer control.47 When 
                                                                                                                         
43 Indeed, the SEIU local union seeking to represent adjunct professors at Seattle University 
withdrew its charge that the university was unlawfully refusing to bargain collectively after President 
Trump was elected. SEIU Local 925’s Motion to Remand, Seattle Univ., Case 19-CA-185605 (NLRB 
Oct. 18, 2017); Seattle Univ., NLRB (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CA-185605
[https://perma.cc/6HD5-GXWT].
44 See supra Part I.A (providing examples of schools that have engaged in collective bargaining).
45 See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for 
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 837–39 (2005) (exploring reasons employers might agree 
to neutrality). 
46 See James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union 
Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 738–39 (2010) (identifying union incentives to 
obtain neutrality agreements); Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why 
Union Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2622 (2011) 
(describing the role of comprehensive campaigns in union organizing).
47 See B. Jesse Hill, Kingdom Without End? The Inevitable Expansion of Religious Sovereignty 
Claims, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1177, 1185 (2017) (arguing that Hobby Lobby “vindicated the 
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employers successfully press religious liberty claims, the effect is 
deregulatory48—certain employers are freed to exert control over or impose 
conditions on their employees in ways that would otherwise be unlawful.49
Looking at these cases through this lens, readers can group religious
freedom cases involving employers with cases arising in other areas of law 
(including labor law) that reflect explicit or implicit assumptions about 
enterprises’ managerial prerogatives.50 Indeed, others have convincingly 
pointed out that many aspects of labor law reflect courts’ assumptions 
about the scope of legitimate employer control;51 religious accommodation 
cases seem to reflect the same judicial impulse, at least in part.
For example, as described in the previous section, deference to 
employer control is reflected in the way the Catholic Bishop Court
articulated its reasoning, including in its observation that collective 
bargaining would “encroach[] upon the former autonomous position of 
management.”52 That same impulse is also reflected in the handful of later 
Supreme Court cases in which religious employers have successfully 
claimed statutory or constitutional exemptions from certain minimum labor 
standards based on their religious beliefs. (The primary exception, in which 
an employer seeking a religious accommodation lost at the Supreme Court,
involved a religious employer seeking an exemption from the minimum 
wage.53) In contrast, the Court’s cases involving religious accommodations 
for employees have had far more mixed results.
Post-Catholic Bishop cases in which employers won their religious 
exemption claims include Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,54 and 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,55 in 
                                                                                                                         
rights of religious employers to order their own internal affairs—to govern autonomously the terms of 
their relationships with their employees”). 
48 For a broader discussion of the deregulatory potential of corporate religious freedom 
arguments, see Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1507–08 
(2015) (observing the deregulatory potential of religious exemptions). 
49 Id. at 1514–15 (discussing ways that Hobby Lobby’s rationale frees religious employers from 
complying with statutory limits on their authority to make decisions regarding what benefits to provide 
and who to hire or fire). 
50 See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights 
After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1057 (2013) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has, in some cases, privileged the free speech of enterprises over the free speech of their 
dissenting members). 
51 See, e.g., James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales,
103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 518–19 (2004) (exploring assumptions in labor law that favor employers); 
Richard Michael Fischl, Labor Law, the Left, and the Lure of the Market, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 947, 955–
56 (2011) (arguing that judges often reify employers’ perspectives).
52 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 503 (1979).
53 Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
54 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
55 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
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addition to Hobby Lobby. The issue in Amos was whether Title VII’s 
exemption for religious organizations violated the Establishment Clause, 
particularly as applied to employment decisions involving employees who 
had secular duties—in Amos, a building engineer employed at a 
gymnasium that was open to the public.56 The Court held that Congress 
could reasonably have decided to draw the exemption broadly in order to 
remove from religious organizations the “significant burden” of
“predict[ing] which of its activities a secular court will consider 
religious.”57 In other words, the Court upheld Congress’s decision to 
extend Title VII’s statutory exemption to cover secular employees of 
religious organizations because a narrower exemption might result in 
litigation and therefore chill religious employers in their choice of 
co-religionists for some jobs. 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held that the “ministerial exception” was 
an affirmative defense to a ministerial employee’s discrimination lawsuit,
because churches had the right under both religion clauses to choose whom
to employ as their ministers.58 In that decision, the Court equated
managerial rights with the core of religious freedom, contrasting “outward 
physical acts” such as religiously motivated peyote use, with employment 
decisions that would “affect[] the faith and mission of the church itself.”59
Thus, while the Court recognized that both peyote use and hiring or firing a 
ministerial employee could be motivated by religion, only the latter gives 
rise to an exemption from generally applicable law, a distinction that has 
been criticized by some commentators.60 Additionally, the Hosanna-Tabor
Court suggested the decision may not extend to employment eligibility 
cases—as Christopher Lund puts it, cases implicating the relationship 
between the employer and the government.61 Thus, whereas it is easy to 
imagine a church arguing that its ability to hire a minister without work 
authorization in the United States was an employment decision that 
                                                                                                                         
56 483 U.S. at 330–31, 333. Title VII’s exemption for religious organizations applies only to 
discrimination based on religion, rather than other protected characteristics. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) 
(2012) (“This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion 
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society of its activities.”). 
57 Amos, 483 U.S. at 336. 
58 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.
59 Id. at 190.
60 See Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 984 (2013) (arguing that 
“[i]t is unacceptable that religious individuals must obey the law but religious institutions need not”)
61 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 710 (“Nor, according to the Church, would the exception bar 
government enforcement of general laws restricting eligibility for employment, because the exception 
applies only to suits by or on behalf of ministers themselves.”); see Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise 
Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (2014); cf. Hill, 
supra note 47, at 1191–92 (noting the high “cost of departure from religious employment”).
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implicated its “faith and mission,” the ministerial exemption likely does
not apply.62 In other words, employment law is different: whereas many 
sorts of generally applicable laws may apply equally to churches as to 
other institutions, employment law does not.
The exemptions in Catholic Bishop and Hosanna-Tabor have at least 
two important similarities. First, neither the Catholic Bishop nor the 
Hosanna-Tabor standard demands that employers attempting to qualify for 
protection under either case actually state that an accommodation was 
necessary because of a conflict between their religious beliefs and secular 
law.63 Thus, a parochial school can avoid NLRB jurisdiction even if its 
leadership does not believe there is a conflict between collective 
bargaining and their religious commitments, and it can fire a ministerial 
employee for no reason other than a desire not to pay the costs involved in 
providing a reasonable accommodation that would otherwise be required 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Second, in neither case did the 
Court consider whether there was a way to compensate employees in part 
for their lost statutory rights and protections—instead, the only choices for 
employees who have lost statutory protections under either of these cases 
are to grin and bear it or to quit.64
For another indication that ideas about the importance of employer 
prerogative play at least an implicit role in religious accommodation 
disputes, we might look to cases involving the religious exercise rights of 
employees. That is, if norms about employer control influence 
congressional or court decisions about the scope of religious 
accommodations, then we would expect religious accommodations for 
employees to be narrower than accommodations for employers. And 
indeed, this is the case. Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act contains 
protections for religious employees, including those who need an 
accommodation because their religious practices are inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                         
62 Lund, supra note 61, at 1193 (arguing that the Court’s distinction is explained by the 
employee’s consent to be treated according to church principles and decisions); see also Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental Value of Religious Groups, 92 
WASH. U. L. REV. 73, 95–96 (2014) (discussing the Hosanna-Tabor Court’s failure to offer a clear 
explanation of the ministerial exemption’s boundaries). 
63 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 506 (1979) (concluding that Congress did not 
intend an NLRA provision to apply to church-operated schools and articulating no conditions for 
officials at church-operated schools to qualify for that exemption); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–92
(determining that an employee qualified for the ministerial exemption by looking to “all the 
circumstances of her employment,” rather than any communications made by the employee in pursuit 
of an exemption).
64 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507 (rejecting extension of NLRB’s jurisdiction to 
church-operated schools because that would implicate constitutional issues); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 
at 194 (noting that the relief sought “is precisely [the relief] that is barred by the ministerial 
exception”).
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employer work rules.65 However, Title VII’s religious accommodation 
provision applies only if the desired accommodation does not cause “undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business,”66 and the Supreme 
Court has held that an undue hardship includes anything that qualifies as 
“more than a de minimis cost.”67 As others have observed, this is a major 
limitation that sharply diminishes the usefulness of Title VII for religious 
employees, in contrast to its broadly protective approach to religious 
employers, as seen in Amos.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that there are limits to states’ 
abilities to compel employers to accommodate religious employees. In 
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, the Court struck down on Establishment 
Clause grounds a Connecticut statute that gave every employee an absolute 
right to refuse to work on his or her Sabbath.68 The Court’s reasoning 
focused mainly on the burdens imposed on employers when employees 
exercised their rights under the statute. For example, the Court wrote that:
There is no exception under the statute for special 
circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer 
employed in an occupation with a Monday through Friday 
schedule—a school teacher, for example; the statute provides 
for no special consideration if a high percentage of an 
employer’s work force asserts rights to the same Sabbath. 
Moreover, there is no exception when honoring the dictates 
of Sabbath observers would cause the employer substantial 
economic burdens or when the employer’s compliance would 
require the imposition of significant burdens on other 
employees required to work in place of the Sabbath 
observers. Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as 
to whether the employer has made reasonable 
accommodation proposals.69
In that passage (and elsewhere in the opinion), the Court mentions both 
employers and nonadherent employees, seemingly expressing concern 
about the statute’s effect on both groups. But closer inspection reveals that 
the Court’s primary concern was the statute’s infringement on employers’ 
                                                                                                                         
65 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1 (2012).
66 Id. § 2000e(j).
67 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (“To require TWA to bear more 
than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”); see also Dallan 
F. Flake, Bearing Burdens: Religious Accommodations that Adversely Affect Coworker Morale,
76 OHIO ST. L.J. 169, 170–72 (2015) (discussing the de minimis standard); Dallan F. Flake, Image Is
Everything: Corporate Branding and Religious Accommodation in the Workplace, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
699, 718–19 (2015) (addressing inconsistent application of the de minimis standard).
68 472 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1985).
69 Id. at 709–10 (citations omitted). 
870 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4
managerial prerogatives. First, there is the purpose of the statute itself,
which was concerned with limiting employers’ authority to fire workers at 
will for a single reason: refusing to work on the Sabbath. It did not, 
however, require employers to respond to that limitation by forcing 
existing employees to cover for their Sabbath-observing coworkers; 
instead, employers could have adjusted their opening hours or hired more 
employees who were willing to work weekends. Second, each of the 
burdens in the paragraph above is phrased in terms of restrictions or 
inconveniences that befall employers, not employees; even where 
employees are mentioned, it is in terms of the employer having to 
“impose” significant burdens on them—a construction that brings to mind 
an autocratic employer that adjusts to life under the statute by forcing 
unwilling (but nonreligious) employees to work on their coworkers’ 
Sabbaths instead of taking any of the other available paths.
Taking these cases together, a picture emerges: where employers’ 
rights are concerned, Congress and the Supreme Court have been willing to 
grant exemptions even at the cost of fundamental statutory protections for 
employees. Conversely, where employees’ religious liberty rights are at 
stake, the Court has interpreted narrowly or even struck down the relevant 
statutes—again preserving employer control.70
B. Valuable Exemptions & the Possibility of (Partially) Compensating 
Employees for Their Loss of Rights
Cases involving exemptions from NLRA coverage also help 
demonstrate one way in which certain religious accommodations for 
employers differ from one another: some are likely to make the employer 
more competitive in the secular marketplace.71 This distinction implicates 
both employers’ incentives to claim exemptions and the list of third parties
who are burdened by accommodations.
An accommodation in the form of an exemption from federal labor law 
is a considerable deregulatory concession. It means not only freedom from 
the obligation to bargain collectively with an elected labor union, but also 
freedom to ignore statutory protections for employees’ concerted activity, 
which apply whether or not those employees have voted to unionize.72
Thus, unlike an employer who is subject to NLRB jurisdiction, an 
employer who is exempt is free to punish or even fire employees who 
discuss their own pay or other working conditions amongst themselves;
                                                                                                                         
70 To be clear, this is not to say that employer control is the only explanation for these decisions, 
but rather, simply to point out that it is a common thread running through them.
71 Cf. Matthew T. Bodie, Faith and the Firm, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 609, 626-27 (2016) (“[T]he 
stronger a corporation’s internal commitment to a religious, philosophical, political, or cultural mission, 
the more such a corporation is differentiating itself . . . from the general norms of commerce.”).
72 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
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who distribute union literature in nonworking areas during nonworking 
time; who use their work-issued email addresses to discuss working 
conditions or union organizing; or who go out on strike. Finally, there is 
the union wage premium to consider—unionized employees tend to make 
more than their nonunion counterparts,73 so the exemption from the 
obligation to bargain collectively can mean cost savings for an employer.
In light of these consequences, it is easy to see why a hypothetical 
employer—particularly a for-profit employer or one that operates in a 
competitive marketplace—might be inclined to seek a religious exemption 
from the NLRA. 
This is one way an exemption from the NLRA is arguably different 
than some of the other religious exemptions or accommodations discussed 
in the Introduction to this Article. For the reasons listed in the previous 
paragraph, employers have clearer financial incentives to seek an 
exemption from NLRB jurisdiction than to seek other common types of 
accommodations or exemptions. For example, an exemption from the 
contraceptive mandate has an uncertain effect on employers’ or insurers’ 
costs,74 and refusing to include contraceptive coverage in employees’ 
benefits packages may prompt some consumers to boycott and others to go 
out of their way to patronize an establishment.75 Likewise, an employer 
that does not offer contraceptive coverage may have a more difficult time 
recruiting qualified employees than the many employers that do offer 
coverage.
In contrast, only a small minority of private sector employers are 
unionized, and it is common for employers to overtly oppose employees’ 
collective action. That means an employer’s religious objection to NLRB 
jurisdiction seems unlikely to place it at a competitive disadvantage 
vis-à-vis many potential employees, even as it provides a competitive 
advantage vis-à-vis other employers. As further evidence that at least some 
employers would view an NLRA exemption as valuable, one need only 
look to states in the southeastern United States, which sometimes tout their 
                                                                                                                         
73 BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., TABLE 2. MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND 
SALARY WORKERS BY UNION AFFILIATION AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t02.htm [https://perma.cc/93EY-K5UR] (last modified Jan. 
19, 2018).
74 See Austin Frakt, Does Birth Control Coverage Pay for Itself?, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/upshot/does-contraceptive-coverage-pay-for-itself.html 
[https://perma.cc/8CYS-WEP4] (discussing the debate on whether “contraceptive coverage pays for 
itself in the long term” from an insurer’s perspective).
75 This dynamic has repeatedly played out in recent years. See, e.g., Arselia Gates, Fill the Cart or 
Boycott Hobby Lobby?, DALL. NEWS (July 2014), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/retail/2014/07/02/fill-the-cart-or-boycott-hobby-lobby 
[https://perma.cc/5BB2-B9K9] (discussing how after the Hobby Lobby decision, some shoppers 
mentioned that they would start shopping at Hobby Lobby’s competitors, while other shoppers 
indicated support for or indifference to Hobby Lobby).
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relatively “union free” status as a basis to attract new business.76 Similarly, 
the ministerial exception may be valuable to employers, even though it 
applies only to a limited class of “ministerial” employees. That is, religious 
employers can be sure that a decision to demote or fire a ministerial 
employee will not lead to an expensive trial or an award of damages77—a
significant concession, as the Court seemed to recognize in its discussion 
of litigation risk in Amos.
This means there are two groups that are potentially affected by 
employer religious exemptions: employees, who lose the benefits of 
statutory rights that they would otherwise have; and market competitors 
that must comply with laws from which one or more religious competitors 
are exempt. Although the latter group has not received much attention in 
recent cases, potential effects on market competitors were part of the 
reason the Court rejected the employer’s religious defense to its 
noncompliance with the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in Alamo 
Foundation.78 There, the petitioner was a religiously affiliated nonprofit 
organization that operated several commercial establishments for the 
purpose of funding its own religious activities.79 It employed “associates,” 
whom the Court described as “drug addicts, derelicts, or criminals before 
their conversion and rehabilitation by the Foundation.”80 In lieu of any 
wage or salary, the Foundation provided these employees “food, clothing, 
shelter, and other benefits.”81 Although the employees disavowed any 
desire to be paid—they “considered themselves volunteers who were 
working only for religious and evangelical reasons”82—the Court held that 
the Foundation had violated the FLSA, rejecting its argument for an 
exemption based on its religious character.83
Affirming the lower court’s rejection of the Foundation’s argument 
that its “businesses function as ‘churches in disguise,’” the Court cited the 
effect of an FLSA exemption on the Foundation’s competitors: 
[T]he Foundation’s businesses serve the general public in 
competition with ordinary commercial enterprises . . . and the 
                                                                                                                         
76 See, e.g., STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN LABOR: TOWARD A NEW
WORKER’S MOVEMENT (2015) (observing that southern states “offer corporations lower wages and a 
nonunion work environment,” among other incentives, and “foreign companies build their facilities in
these communities that offer a ‘union-free’ environment”); Ned Resnikoff, How Tenn. Politicians 
Killed Volkswagen Unionization, MSNBC (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/tennessee-
volkswagen-chattanooga-union#51477 [https://perma.cc/4Q2H-9X3S] (discussing attempts by 
Tennessee politicians to prevent employees at a Volkswagen plant from unionizing).
77 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195 (2012).
78 Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
79 Id. at 292.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 293.
83 Id. at 295–99.
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payment of substandard wages would undoubtedly give 
petitioners and similar organizations an advantage over their 
competitors. It is exactly this kind of ‘unfair method of 
competition’ that the [FLSA] was intended to prevent . . . and 
the admixture of religious motivations does not alter a 
business’s effect on commerce.84
The statutory context and the fact that Alamo Foundation was an 
enforcement action brought by the government made this case a 
particularly good vehicle to highlight effects on competitors. That explains 
why the Amos Court rejected a similar argument, observing that “[i]t is not 
clear why appellees should have standing to represent the interests of 
secular employers,” and that in any event, the religious employer 
exemption in Title VII did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.85
However, the Amos Court did not deny that the scope of Title VII’s 
religious exemption could have implications for competitors—rather, it 
simply found that those implications did not make a legal difference, given 
the case’s statutory context and procedural posture.
As these cases show, courts considering the scope of accommodations 
for religious employers at least sometimes take into account competitors’ 
interests. Moreover, as I have argued, where employers are entitled to 
religious exemptions or accommodations, they should be (and may be 
legally required to be) structured narrowly in order to minimize the 
burdens imposed on employees.86
In this regard, the NLRB cases show that at least some employers’ 
religious accommodation claims are amenable to solutions that partially 
compensate employees for the costs they incur as a result of the 
accommodation. This is ironic because, as discussed above, Catholic 
Bishop does not require religious employers to compensate employees for 
the loss of their NLRA rights at all—it is an example of what Henry 
Chambers Jr. has characterized as the Supreme Court’s persistent failure to 
“seriously consider employee rights as a counterbalance to the extension of 
the employer’s free exercise rights” in recent employer free exercise 
cases.87
I have previously argued that collective bargaining under the NLRA 
provides a built-in structure for unions and employers to negotiate religious 
                                                                                                                         
84 Id. at 299.
85 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 339 n.16 (1987).
86 Garden, supra note 17, at 157. 
87 Henry L. Chambers Jr., The Problems Inherent in Litigating Employer Free Exercise Rights,
86 COLO. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (2015); see also Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of 
Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 320 (2014) (“When granting 
injunctions against the contraceptive benefit, courts typically ignore the economic reality that employee 
benefits are a form of compensation, like wages earned by and belonging to the employee.”). 
874 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4
accommodations in a way that both protects employers’ free exercise and 
compensates employees for the loss of their statutory rights.88 That 
discussion focused mainly on employers that objected to particular 
collective bargaining outcomes, such as the possibility that a union would 
call for the employer to provide contraceptive coverage. But a real-world 
example shows that it can even be possible for unions and religious 
employers to come together to negotiate an entire unionization and 
collective bargaining structure that protects employers’ religious 
commitments while also ensuring that employees have the option to 
unionize and bargain collectively in a fashion that is reasonably similar 
to—and in some ways more employee-friendly than—the NLRA. 
In 2009, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and a group 
of labor leaders produced a document entitled Respecting the Just Rights of 
Workers: Guidance and Options for Catholic Health Care and Unions.89
The document, which was the product of lengthy discussions that took
place over the course of years, sets out a framework for union drives that 
includes both broad statements of shared values and much more specific 
expectations about acceptable and unacceptable employer and union tactics 
during an organizing campaign.90 As former SEIU General Counsel Judith 
Scott put it:
[The] document underscores the importance of respect for 
both parties. It emphasizes that a code of conduct should be 
worked out beyond the requirements of the National Labor 
Relations Act to reflect the Catholic social teachings and to 
promote a fair way in which workers can choose a union that 
goes beyond the basic protections you get under current labor 
law.91
This document reflects the sort of compromise that the Court seemed 
to hope might ultimately resolve the disputes that gave rise to both Zubik
and Hobby Lobby, and for which some commentators have also expressed 
support.92 It may seem surprising that it arose in the context of labor law, 
where the Catholic Bishop approach leads to all-or-nothing exemptions 
from NLRB jurisdiction and does not require religious employers to 
                                                                                                                         
88 Garden, supra note 17, at 158.
89 Respecting the Just Rights of Workers: Guidance and Options for Catholic Health Care and 
Unions, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS 1 (June 22, 2009), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-
action/human-life-and-dignity/labor-employment/upload/respecting_the_just_rights_of_workers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6YRX-TYMV].
90 See id. at 8–9 (discussing employer and union communications with employees during an 
organizing drive).
91 Jack Ahern et al., The Future of Labor Plenary Panel Discussion, 50 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD.
149 (2011). 
92 See Brady, supra note 5, at 1124 (stating that the decision in Zubik shows promise for resolving 
future issues over religious accommodation). 
2018] RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION AT WORK 875
attempt compromise with employees and their unions.93 But it is unlikely
that Catholic Bishop would apply to religious hospitals, and moreover, 
labor law is structured so that two entities that are relatively equal in their 
understanding of labor law and organizing strategies can sit across the 
table from each other and hammer out an agreement. Importantly, the 
Catholic hospital framework had only institutional signatories—employers 
and unions—rather than individual employees, who likely would have 
lacked the necessary legal and practical knowledge necessary to negotiate
meaningfully, and also would have been too numerous for negotiations to 
be useful. That is, a degree of institutional longevity and expertise is 
necessary to iron out a bargain regarding employer religious
accommodations. These conditions are not likely to be present where 
individual employees or consumers will pay the price for a corporate 
religious accommodation—a state of affairs that the Supreme Court 
implicitly recognized in Zubik and Hobby Lobby by treating the 
government (rather than affected employees) as the potential negotiating 
partner of religious employers.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s goal has been to expand the parameters of the current 
debate over corporate religious accommodations by adding labor law to the 
discussion. To be sure, there are some key legal, practical, and contextual
differences between the labor law context and other more high-profile 
contexts, including the ACA’s contraceptive coverage requirement. 
However, these differences highlight important questions that arise across 
different contexts, including the extent to which religious accommodation 
law reflects or is in part driven by secular assumptions and values, and how 
and when to encourage “compromise” accommodations that at least 
partially compensate employees or others who bear the costs of religious 
accommodations.
                                                                                                                         
93 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 506 (1979). 
